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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
6 
Plaintiffs are individuals and members of groups who 
pay tolls to travel on the Pennsylvania Turnpike.1  They allege 
that Pennsylvania state entities and officials (“Defendants”) 
have violated the dormant Commerce Clause and their right to 
travel.2 Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants have set 
exorbitantly high tolls for use of the Pennsylvania Turnpike 
and that the amounts collected exceed the costs to operate the 
Turnpike.  They contend the extra funds are being used for 
projects that disproportionately benefit local interests and that 
the high tolls deter non-Pennsylvanians from using the 
Turnpike. 
 
 Because Congress has permitted state authorities, such 
as Defendants, to use the tolls for non-Turnpike purposes, the 
collection and use of the tolls do not implicate the Commerce 
Clause.  Moreover, because Plaintiffs have not alleged that 
their right to travel to, from, and within Pennsylvania has been 
deterred, their right to travel has not been infringed.  Therefore, 
                                                 
1 Plaintiffs are Owner Operator Independent Drivers 
Association, Inc.; National Motorist Association; Marion L. 
Spray; B.L. Reever Transport, Inc.; Flat Rock Transportation, 
LLC; Milligan Trucking, Inc.; Frank Scavo; and Laurence G. 
Tarr. 
2 Defendants are the Pennsylvania Turnpike 
Commission (“PTC”), William K. Lieberman, Vice Chair of 
the PTC; Barry Drew, Secretary-Treasurer of the PTC; 
Pasquale T. Deon, Sr., and John N. Wozniak, Commissioners 
of the PTC; Mark P. Compton, Chief Executive Officer of the 
PTC; Craig R. Shuey, Chief Operating Officer of the PTC; 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf; and Leslie S. Richards, 
who is both the Chair of the PTC and Secretary of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. 
7 
we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the 






The Pennsylvania Turnpike is part of a 552-mile 
highway system that crosses Pennsylvania from New Jersey to 
Ohio.  The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (“PTC”) sets 
and collects Turnpike tolls.   
 
In 2007, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted Act 44, 
which, among other things, permitted the PTC to increase tolls 
and required the PTC to make annual payments for a fifty-year 
period to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 
(“PennDOT”) Trust Fund.  See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8915.3.  In 
2013, Act 89 amended Act 44, as amended “Act 44/89.”  Act 
89 continued to permit toll increases but lowered the annual 
payments to the PennDOT Trust Fund.   
 
After Act 44 went into effect, the PTC announced a 25% 
toll increase and from 2009 through 2016, tolls were increased 
annually by more than 10% for cash customers and 5.75% for 
customers using an electronic toll transmitter known as an EZ-
Pass.  Plaintiffs assert that since the enactment of Act 44, tolls 
have increased more than 200% and that the current cost for 
the heaviest vehicles to cross the 359-mile portion of the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike that spans from New Jersey to Ohio 
exceeds $1800.  Pennsylvania’s Auditor General found that 
PTC’s annual “costly toll increases place an undue burden” on 
Pennsylvanians, opined that “the average turnpike traveler will 
be deterred by the increased cost and seek alternative toll-free 
8 
routes,”  App. 88 (emphasis omitted) (quoting September 2016 
Performance Audit of the PTC), and recommended that the 
PTC seek legislative relief from its Act 44/89 payment 
obligations.     
 
Tolls are PTC’s largest revenue source and amount to 
166-215% of the costs to maintain and operate the Turnpike.  
Simply put, the amount of the tolls collected exceeds the 
amount it costs to run the Turnpike.  The excess tolls are 
deposited into the PennDOT Trust Fund, which are, in turn, 
transferred to four different programs: (1) operating programs 
under 74 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1513, which include asset 
maintenance costs and expenses for public passenger transport; 
(2) the multimodal transportation fund under 74 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2104, which covers aviation, freight and passenger rail, and 
port and waterway projects; (3) the asset improvement 
program under 74 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1514 for financial 
assistance for the improvement, replacement, or expansion of 
capital projects; and (4) programs of statewide significance 
under 74 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1516, which include disability 
programs, rail and bus services, community transportation, 
Welfare-to-Work programs, and research projects.  Act 44/89 
is designed to generate $450 million annually for PennDOT 
from 2011 through 2022.3  More than ninety percent of Act 
44/89 payments—approximately $425 million annually—
benefit “non-Turnpike road and bridge projects and transit 
operations.”  App. 78.  Plaintiffs allege that many of these 
“programs have no functional relationship to the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike,” including, for instance, the “[c]onstruction of an 
                                                 
3 Act 44/89 payments will generate $50 million 
annually for PennDOT from 2023 through 2057. 
9 
underpass” and a “[s]idewalk installation.”4  App. 81-82.  
Plaintiffs concede that a federal statute, the Intermodal Surface 
                                                 
4 Plaintiffs allege that Act 44/89 funds have been used 
for various programs across the state including: 
 
a. Development of Three Crossings, a mixed-use 
development consisting of residential units, 
office space, and a transportation facility with 
vehicle and bicycle parking, bicycle repair, 
electric-vehicle charging stations, kayak storage, 
and transit station in Pittsburgh (Allegheny 
County); 
 
b.  Construction of an underpass under U.S. 22, 
connecting the Lower Trail with Canoe Creek 
State Park (Blair County); 
 
c. Rehabilitation of nine stone-arch bridges along 
the SEPTA regional railway line (Regional 
project); 
 
d.  Replacement of the roof at Collier Bus Garage 
(Allegheny County);  
 
e.  Sidewalk installation along North Main Street 
in Yardley (Bucks County); 
 
f.  Installation of approximately 1,800 feet of 
ADA-compliant sidewalk along the south side of 
Union Deposit Road between Shield Street and 
Powers Avenue at the Union Square Shopping 
Center in Susquehanna (Dauphin County);  
10 
                                                 
 
g. Extension of internal road, including final 
design, survey, permit modifications, bid 
documents, construction, storm water, street 
lights, project administration, legal expenses, 
audit expenses, and contingencies in Windy 
Ridge Business and Technology Park (Indiana 
County); 
 
h.  Improvements to roadways in 12,000 acres of 
parks, including widening shoulders, paving, 
signage installation, and bicycle marking in the 
Allegheny County Parks; 
 
i.  Addition of eight curb ramps, new asphalt, 
four decorative crosswalks and a surface sign at 
an intersection in Latrobe (Westmoreland 
County); 
 
j. Phase II Construction of Erie Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority’s Maintenance and 
Paratransit Bus Storage Facility (Erie County); 
 
k. Improvements to the Erie International Airport 
terminal building (Erie County); 
 
l.  Creation of a multi-use trail and installing 
associated signage from the West End 
neighborhood linking existing bike routes to a 
multiuse path that connects to The Pennsylvania 
State University (Centre County); 
 
11 
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (“ISTEA”), Pub. L. No. 
102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (codified as amended in scattered 
titles), authorizes these types of projects.  Nonetheless, they 
assert that the toll costs burden interstate commerce and 
“discourag[e] both business and private travelers from using 
the Turnpike.” App. 99. 
  
                                                 
m. Creation of a pedestrian island at the 
intersection of Park Avenue and McKee Street in 
State College to provide a safer crossing for 
pedestrians and cyclists and accommodate the 
accessibility needs of vision-impaired residents 
(Centre County); 
 
n. Construction of a new two-way industrial 
access road, realigning a portion of the Nittany 
& Bald Eagle Railroad Main Line to 
accommodate the access road, and constructing 
new sidings and operating tracks for First 
Quality Tissue’s two existing facilities and a 
proposed new facility (Clinton County); 
 
o. Construction of an 85-car unit train loop track 
in the Keystone Regional Industrial Park to 
connect with an existing Norfolk Southern main 
line track and serve a Deerfield Farms Service 
grain elevator facility in Greenwood (Crawford 
County). 
 




Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a putative class 
alleging violations of the dormant Commerce Clause and their 
right to travel.5  Defendants moved to dismiss and Plaintiffs 
moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.  
  
The District Court granted Defendants’ motions to 
dismiss6 and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.  
See generally Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Pa. Tpk. 
Comm’n, No. 1:18-cv-00608, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2019 WL 
                                                 
5 The Complaint seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that 
PTC’s tolls and the provisions of Act 44/89 that direct the PTC 
to make payments to PennDOT violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause and the constitutional right to travel, (2) a preliminary 
and permanent injunction enjoining both the excess tolls and 
payments under Act 44/89, and (3) a judgment against 
Defendants ordering the refund of excess toll payments.     
6 Certain Defendants also moved in the alternative for 
summary judgment.  Although the District Court outlined the 
legal standards for both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) and 56, Owner Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Pa. 
Tpk. Comm’n, No. 1:18-cv-00608, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2019 WL 
1493182, at *8-9 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2019), and, at the outset of 
its dormant Commerce Clause analysis, referenced 
“undisputed” facts, id. at *18, it applied the Rule 12(b)(6) 
standard, concluding that Plaintiffs’ “factual allegations do not 
support a claim for violations of the dormant Commerce 
Clause or the constitutional right to travel,” and granting “the 
PTC Defendants’ and Commonwealth Defendants’ motions to 
dismiss,” id. at *24.  We therefore review the District Court’s 
opinion granting a motion to dismiss.  See infra note 7. 
13 
1493182 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2019).  The Court applied the test 
set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), 
and held that, because the alleged burdens from the tolls are 
equally imposed on both in- and out-of-state drivers, they are 
general burdens on commerce that do not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause, Owner Operator, 2019 WL 1493182, at 
*22.  The Court also held that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 
that their right to interstate travel was infringed because they 
asserted only that the toll structure deterred Turnpike travel.  








 The Commerce Clause confers upon Congress the 
                                                 
7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1343.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ complaint is plenary.  Burtch v. Milberg Factors, 
Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).  To withstand a motion 
to dismiss, a complaint must allege a claim “that is plausible 
on its face” when accepting all the factual allegations as true 
and drawing every reasonable inference in favor of the 
nonmoving party.  Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 
780, 786 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  In reviewing a complaint,  we disregard 
conclusory assertions and bare recitations of the elements.  Id. 
at 786 n.2.   
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power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  By negative implication, 
Congress’s authority to regulate commerce prohibits the states 
from enacting “laws that unduly restrict interstate commerce.”  
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 
2449, 2459 (2019).  This “dormant Commerce Clause” bars 
states from discriminating against or unduly burdening 
interstate commerce, for instance by enacting protectionist 
regulations that give in-state businesses an advantage over out-
of-state businesses, see, e.g., Pike, 397 U.S. at 144-45, or by 
assessing fees that “threaten the free movement of commerce 
by placing a financial barrier around the [s]tate,” Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284 (1987).   
 
Congress, however, may authorize a state to take 
actions that burden interstate commerce.  S. Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018).  “[W]hen Congress 
exercises its power to regulate commerce by enacting 
legislation, the legislation controls.”  Id.  Thus, where Congress 
has spoken and state or local governments take actions that are 
“specifically authorized by Congress,” those actions are “not 
subject to the Commerce Clause even if [they] interfere[] with 
interstate commerce.” 8  White v. Mass. Council of Constr. 
Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 213 (1983) (citation omitted).  In 
short, as applied here, if Congress authorizes an action, such as 
using tolls for non-toll road purposes, then “no dormant 
Commerce Clause issue is presented.”  Id.   
                                                 
8 Absent such legislation, “Congress has left it to the 
courts to formulate the rules to preserve the free flow of 
interstate commerce.”  Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2090 (internal 




To determine whether Congress has authorized such 
action and thereby “removed [it] from the reach of the dormant 
Commerce Clause,” we must consider whether its intent is 
“unmistakably clear.”  S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. 
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984); see Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. 
Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 
(1985) (“When Congress so chooses, state actions which it 
plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack 
under the Commerce Clause.”).  While “congressional intent 
and policy to insulate state legislation from Commerce Clause 
attack [must be] ‘expressly stated,’” “[t]here is no talismanic 
significance to the phrase ‘expressly stated.’”  S.-Cent. Timber, 
467 U.S. at 90-91.  “‘Expressly stated’ . . . merely states one 
way of meeting the requirement that for a state regulation to be 
removed from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, 
congressional intent must be unmistakably clear.”  Id. at 91.  
That is, Congress “need not expressly state that it is authorizing 
a state to engage in activity that would otherwise violate the 
[d]ormant Commerce Clause.”  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 886 F.3d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 2018).  
Rather, Congress “need only clearly allow the state to engage 




Defendants contend that Congress, through ISTEA, 
specifically authorized states to enact legislation that allocates 
highway tolls for purposes unrelated to the toll road.  If a state’s 
actions fall within the scope of Congress’s authorization, then 
the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply.  We therefore 
16 
begin by analyzing whether ISTEA authorizes Defendants’ 
conduct.9   
 
Under ISTEA, “Congress sought to foster a National 
Intermodal Transportation System, consisting of all forms of 
transportation in a unified, interconnected manner.”  Am. 
Trucking, 886 F.3d at 242 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Before ISTEA, “Congress enacted the Surface Transportation 
Assistance Act (‘STAA’),” which provided “federal financial 
support” for toll roads.  Id. at 241.  STAA required that for state 
public authorities maintaining highways “to receive federal 
financial aid,” they “had to discontinue levying tolls once they 
had collected sufficient revenues to retire outstanding bonds” 
that funded the highways.  Id.  “If those authorities failed to 
make a toll road free once they had collected sufficient tolls to 
retire those bonds, STAA required them to repay the federal 
government for the financing it had provided them.”  Id. at 241-
42.  ISTEA, however, “freed states from their obligation under 
the STAA to repay the federal government should they 
continue to collect tolls after retiring outstanding debts, and 
granted them greater flexibility to operate toll facilities and use 
toll revenues for a variety of transportation projects.”  Id. at 
                                                 
9 Principles of constitutional avoidance counsel us to 
first address whether a statutory ground resolves the case, and 
thereby renders unnecessary the need to answer the 
“constitutional question” here of whether the Defendants’ toll 
collection and allocation place an undue burden on interstate 
commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.  
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485 (2000) (quoting 
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
17 
242.  To that end, ISTEA “broadened the list of purposes for 
which states could use federal funds.”  Id.   
 
ISTEA regulates the use of “toll revenues” by “[a] 
public authority,” such as the PTC,10 and enumerates the 
categories for which toll revenues may be used.  23 U.S.C. 
§ 129(a)(3)(A).  ISTEA provides that the public authority 
“shall ensure that all toll revenues received from operation of 
the toll facility are used only for”:  
 
• debt service;  
 
• “a reasonable return on investment of any 
private person financing the project”; 
 
• “any costs necessary” to improve, operate, 
and maintain the toll facility; and  
 
• payments to private parties (where 
applicable) “if the toll facility is subject to a 
public-private partnership agreement.” 
 
Id. § 129(a)(3)(A)(i)-(iv).  In addition, if “the public authority 
certifies annually that the tolled facility is being adequately 
maintained,” ISTEA permits the public authority to use toll 
revenues for “any other purpose for which Federal funds may 
be obligated by a State under [title 23].”  Id. § 129(a)(3)(A)(v).  
In short, ISTEA allows a public authority to use toll revenues 
for non-toll road projects.   
                                                 
10 A “public authority” includes a state “instrumentality 
with authority to finance, build, operate or maintain toll . . . 
facilities.”  23 U.S.C. § 101(a)(21).   
18 
Pursuant to title 23, federal funds “may be obligated” 
for several broad categories of items, id., and at least two 
statutory subsections authorize expenditures unrelated to the 
toll road itself.  For example, ISTEA authorizes states to 
construct, among other things, “transit capital projects eligible 
for assistance under chapter 53 of title 49.”  Id. § 133(b)(1)(C).  
Subject to certain conditions, capital projects may include 
“walkways,” “pedestrian and bicycle access to [] public 
transportation facilit[ies],” and the “construction, renovation, 
and improvement of intercity bus and intercity rail stations and 
terminals.”  49 U.S.C. § 5302(3)(G)(v)(VI)-(VIII).   
 
Title 23 also authorizes states to build “[a]ny type of 
project eligible under this section as in effect on the day before 
the date of enactment of the [Fixing America’s Surface 
Transportation] Act, including projects described under [§] 
101(a)(29) as in effect on such day.”  23 U.S.C. § 133(b)(15).  
Before Congress enacted the Fixing America’s Surface 
Transportation Act in 2015, § 101(a)(29) listed various 
projects under the phrase “[t]ransportation alternatives,” 
including the  
 
[c]onstruction . . . of on-road and off-road trail 
facilities for pedestrians, bicyclists, and other 
nonmotorized forms of transportation, including 
sidewalks, bicycle infrastructure, pedestrian and 
bicycle signals . . . to achieve compliance with 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 
U.S.C. [§] 12101 et seq.).   
 
23 U.S.C. § 101(a)(29)(A) (2012).  “Transportation 
alternatives” also include the “[c]onstruction of turnouts, 
overlooks, and viewing areas.”  Id. § 101(a)(29)(D) (2012).  
19 
Through ISTEA, Congress expressed its “unmistakably 
clear” intent that the Defendants could use toll revenues for 
non-toll road projects.  S.-Cent. Timber, 467 U.S. at 91.  
Congress’s authorization that toll revenues be used for 
purposes other than maintaining and operating the toll road, 
and servicing its debt, necessarily envisions that a public 
authority can collect funds that exceed a toll road’s costs before 
it can spend them.  See 23 U.S.C. § 129(a)(3)(A)(v).  Thus, 
ISTEA contemplated that tolls exceeding the amount needed 
to fund a toll road would be collected and spent on non-toll 
road projects.   
 
Plaintiffs argue that Congress could not have 
contemplated that a state would increase its tolls by over 200% 
to fund non-toll road projects.  Plaintiffs ignore the text of 
ISTEA.  Nowhere in the statute, including § 129(a)(3)(A)(v), 
did Congress cap the amount of toll money a state could raise.  
See Am. Trucking, 886 F.3d at 246 (holding that “a plain 
reading of [ISTEA] reveals that Congress meant to permit [a 
public authority] to continue collecting tolls of whatever 
amount without having to repay federal funds—something that 
it was previously barred from doing once it satisfied its debt 
obligations” (emphasis omitted)).  As we already noted, the 
fact that Congress allowed states to use toll money on non-toll 
road projects presupposes that funds exceeding the amount 
needed for the toll road would be collected.   
 
Nor is there merit to Plaintiffs’ argument that ISTEA 
speaks only to “use” of excess toll revenue, not to “collection” 
or “generation” of toll revenue.  As a matter of common sense, 
however, Congress’s authorization of “use” assumes there is 
toll revenue collected in the first place to be used, and contrary 
to Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Congress was speaking only to 
20 
“nickels and dimes” left over each year due to fluctuating 
Turnpike costs, Oral Arg. Tr. at 18, 77, Congress identified a 
host of big-ticket items that excess tolls could be spent to 
construct, including “highways, bridges, tunnels, . . . ferry 
boats[,] and [ferry] terminal facilities.”  23 U.S.C. § 133(b)(1).  
This further shows that ISTEA did not limit the amount of 
funds the PTC could collect and spend on non-Turnpike 
projects. 
 
Plaintiffs concede that the non-Turnpike related 
projects listed in their complaint for which toll funds were used 
fall within ISTEA’s scope, but contend that Defendants failed 
to satisfy one of ISTEA’s conditions for using the toll funds for 
non-toll road purposes.  As noted earlier, ISTEA requires that 
the public authority “certif[y] annually that the toll facility is 
being adequately maintained” before any excess funds may be 
used for non-toll road projects.  23 U.S.C. § 129(a)(3)(A)(v).  
Defendants conceded before the District Court that they did not 
submit the required annual certifications.  Their failure to 
comply with this condition, however, does not diminish the 
fact that Congress has legislated in the area of interstate 
commerce at issue and blessed the use of tolls for non-toll road 
purposes.11  In other words, the presence or absence of the 
                                                 
11 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ attempt to preclude Defendants 
from relying on § 129(a)(3)(A)(v)’s spending authority 
because they did not fulfill the statute’s certification 
requirements also fails because the statute does not provide a 
private right of action.  See Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 
F.3d 276, 280 (7th Cir. 2000).  Not only is there no private right 
of action, but Congress specified its own remedy here for the 
failure to abide by this condition.  That remedy is vested in the 
Secretary of Transportation, who “may require the public 
21 
annual certification does not otherwise affect Congress’s 
“unambiguous intent to authorize [a state authority, such as the 
PTC,] to allocate excess toll funds” to non-toll road projects.  
Am. Trucking, 886 F.3d at 247.   
 
In sum, “[t]he text is clear”: Congress has authorized the 
states, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to 
generate and use such tolls to fund the type of projects listed in 
Plaintiffs’ complaint.12  Id.  As a result, the collection and use 
of the tolls to fund the challenged expenditures does not violate 
the dormant Commerce Clause, and the District Court properly 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause claim.13 
 
                                                 
authority to discontinue collecting tolls” if she “concludes that 
a public authority has not complied with the limitations on the 
use of revenues described in [§ 129(a)(3)(A)].”  23 U.S.C. 
§ 129(a)(3)(C).  As it is Congress’s prerogative to authorize the 
use of funds at issue and it has done so, we need not adjudicate 
the consequence for the failure to certify. 
12 Because we hold that Congress has authorized 
Defendants to engage in the challenged activity, we need not 
decide whether Pike, 397 U.S. 137, or Evansville-Vanderburgh 
Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972), 
or some other test applies to a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge to a toll. 
13 Although the District Court declined to decide 
whether “Congress has specifically authorized the expenditure 
of toll revenues contemplated by Act 44/89,” Owner Operator, 
2019 WL 1493182, at *22 n.23, we may affirm its order 
dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint “on any ground supported by 
the record,” Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d 




Plaintiffs’ claim that the tolls violate their right to travel 
also fails.  “The constitutional right to travel from one State to 
another, and necessarily to use the highways and other 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies 
a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union.”  
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).  We have 
observed that the right to travel includes “the right of a citizen 
of one State to enter and to leave another State,” Connelly v. 
Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2013), as 
amended (May 10, 2013) (quoting Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
500 (1999)), as well as a right to intrastate travel, see Lutz v. 
City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990), though the 
exact “contours” of that right remain elusive, see United States 
v. Baroni, 909 F.3d 550, 588 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. granted Kelly 
v. United States, No. 18-1059, 2019 WL 588845 (U.S. June 28, 
2019). 
 
To determine whether a state law “sufficiently impinges 
upon the right to travel or migrate to trigger strict scrutiny, [we 
look] to see whether the challenged law’s [1] ‘primary 
objective’ is to impede interstate travel; [2] whether it 
‘penalize[s] the exercise of that right;’ or [3] whether it 
‘actually deters such travel.’”  Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 
F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir. 1998) (fourth alteration in original) 
(quoting Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 
(1986) (plurality opinion)).  
 
Plaintiffs do not assert that the toll penalizes or impedes 
travel.  Rather, Plaintiffs  allege that “the average turnpike 
traveler will be deterred by the increased cost and seek 
alternative toll-free routes[,]” App. 88 (quotation marks and 
23 
citation omitted), and that the tolls “discourag[e] both business 
and private travelers from using the Turnpike,” App. 99.  Thus, 
we must decide whether Plaintiffs have stated a claim that the 
tolls “actually deter[]” interstate or intrastate travel.  Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. at. 903.   
 
“[B]urdens on a single mode of transportation do not 
implicate the right to interstate travel.”14  Miller v. Reed, 176 
F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999).  Moreover, “[b]urdens placed 
on travel generally, such as gasoline taxes, or minor burdens 
impacting interstate travel, such as toll roads, do not constitute 
a violation of” the right to travel.  Id.  Put differently, “[m]inor 
restrictions on travel,” including delays and costs, “simply do 
not amount to the denial of a fundamental right that can be 
upheld only if the Government has a compelling justification.”  
Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1031 (5th Cir. 1991); see 
also Lutz, 899 F.2d at 269 (“[T]he right to travel cannot 
conceivably imply the right to travel whenever, wherever and 
however one pleases—even on roads specifically designed for 
public travel.”).  “A law does not actually deter travel merely 
because it makes it somewhat less attractive for a person to 
travel interstate,” Pollack v. Duff, 793 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), or it is not “the most 
convenient form of travel,” Town of Southold v. Town of E. 
Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 54 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 442 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that law channeling interstate air 
                                                 
14 States may not impose burdens on all modes of 
interstate travel.  See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 39-40, 
46 (1867) (holding unconstitutional a state tax imposed on all 
persons exiting the state or passing through its borders).  
24 
travel through new airport requiring a longer drive had at most 
“negligible” or “trivial” effect on right to travel).   
Because Plaintiffs allege only that the increased tolls 
have caused and will continue to cause Turnpike users to 
switch to non-toll roads in the future,15 and not that interstate 
or intrastate travel has been or will be deterred,16 they have not 
stated a claim that their right to travel has been infringed.  
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                                 
15 In Wallach v. Brezenoff, we applied Evansville to 
evaluate plaintiffs’ assertion that an increase in tolls on all of 
the bridges and tunnels from New Jersey to New York City 
violated their right to travel.  930 F.2d 1070, 1072 (3d Cir. 
1991).  The Evansville Court observed that “facilit[ies] 
provided at public expense [such as highways] aid[] rather than 
hinder[] the right to travel,” and therefore requiring users to 
“pay a reasonable fee” is constitutional.  405 U.S. at 714.  We 
need not engage in such analysis or determine, as Plaintiffs 
urge us to do, whether Evansville supplies the exclusive test of 
constitutionality for certain right to travel claims because 
Plaintiffs here acknowledge that there are non-toll routes to 
travel in and out of Pennsylvania.   
16 Plaintiffs seek to rely on Defendant Wolf’s statements 
on the radio that the tolls deter travel on the Turnpike, but those 
statements are outside of the pleadings and thus are irrelevant 
to whether the complaint states a claim.  
